TTTPS — Byzantine Audit API

Proof-of-Time · Byzantine Detection · GRG Pipeline · Commercial Audit Tool

Attack Detection Capability Matrix

All detected attacks are logged with attack_type, agent_id, ctx_id, and timestamp. Query via GET /audit.

Attack	Detection Mechanism	GRG Layer	Log Field
Token Replay Reuse of a previously valid PoT token	seen_tokens HashMap — duplicate token hash detected on verify	Application	`REPLAY`
Timestamp Drift NTP manipulation, clock skew injection	±60s window check against server time; Roughtime chain_digest bound into GRG commitment — any timestamp deviation causes commitment mismatch	chain_digest → FORGE	`DRIFT` / `FORGE`
Signature Forgery Fake issuer, tampered token body	Ed25519 signature verification against published pubkey — cryptographically unforgeable without issuer private key	Ed25519	`FORGE`
Flood / DDoS Request rate abuse, resource exhaustion	Per-IP and per-agent rate limiting (requests/min); excess requests rejected with 429	Application	`FLOOD`
Ordering Attack Out-of-sequence token submission	Fleet cross-reference — token sequence validated across agent set	Application	`ORDERING`
Cross-Pool Replay Token from Pool A submitted to Pool B	HMAC key derived from keccak256(ctx_id) — cross-pool commitment mismatch is cryptographically certain	HMAC	`FORGE`
Sybil Attack Multiple fake agent IDs from same node	ctx_id HMAC binding — each service context has unique commitment key; cross-context token reuse fails verification	HMAC	`FORGE`
GPS Spoofing Falsified satellite time signals	Roughtime chain spans ≥3 independent time sources; single-source GPS spoof creates chain spread violation → commitment diverges	chain_digest → FORGE	`FORGE`
NTP Injection Rogue NTP server, synchronized clock bias	Roughtime chain_digest is GRG-committed alongside payload — manipulated timestamp shifts chain_digest, breaking Ed25519 signature	chain_digest → Ed25519	`FORGE`
BGP Hijacking Route manipulation, man-in-the-middle	Intercepted tokens cannot be re-signed without issuer private key — any modification invalidates Ed25519 signature	Ed25519	`FORGE`
DNS Poisoning Redirected API endpoint, fake issuer	Issuer pubkey is pinned and published out-of-band; tokens from any other key fail Ed25519 verification	Ed25519	`FORGE`
SDN Flow Manipulation Packet reordering via SDN controller	ORDERING cross-reference detects sequence anomalies; GRG Reed-Solomon layer recovers partial data corruption	RS(4,6) + ORDERING	`ORDERING`
Protocol Violation Malformed token, missing fields	Schema validation on all fields; Golay(23,12,7) ECC detects bit-level corruption	Golay G₂	`INVALID`

GRG Pipeline

All attacks ultimately converge to a commitment mismatch, caught at the Ed25519 layer.

Input Payload (P)
  └─ G₁: Golomb-Rice compression
      └─ R:  Reed-Solomon (4,6) — 2 parity shards, tolerates 2 shard loss
          └─ G₂: Golay(23,12,7) ECC — corrects ≤3 bit errors per codeword
              └─ H:  HMAC-SHA256 (key = keccak256(ctx_id)) — context binding
                  └─ GRG_Commitment = SHA-256(G₂(R(G₁(P ‖ chain_digest)), ctx_id))
                      └─ Ed25519 signature over GRG_Commitment

Audit Log — GET /audit

curl "https://api.kenosian.com/audit?ctx_id=dlr-poc&window=3600" \
  -H "X-API-Key: <your-api-key>"

{
  "ctx_id": "dlr-poc",
  "window_secs": 3600,
  "total_requests": 142,
  "byzantine_total": 3,
  "byzantine_ratio": 0.021,
  "attack_breakdown": {
    "REPLAY":   2,
    "DRIFT":    1,
    "FORGE":    0,
    "FLOOD":    0,
    "ORDERING": 0,
    "INVALID":  0
  }
}

Monitoring

Live Byzantine detection metrics. Access on request — contact heime.jorgen@proton.me

curl https://api.kenosian.com/metrics

tttps_attack_total{type="replay"}   2
tttps_attack_total{type="drift"}    1
tttps_attack_total{type="forge"}    0
tttps_byzantine_ratio               0.021
tttps_valid_count                   139

Grafana dashboard: https://kenosian.com/grafana

Quick Start

# 1. Health check
curl https://api.kenosian.com/health

# 2. Generate PoT token
curl -X POST https://api.kenosian.com/pot/generate \
  -H "X-API-Key: <your-api-key>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"agent_id":"dlr-aipx-01","ctx_id":"dlr-poc"}'

# 3. Verify + Byzantine detection
curl -X POST https://api.kenosian.com/pot/verify \
  -H "X-API-Key: <your-api-key>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"token":"<token>","agent_id":"dlr-aipx-01","ctx_id":"dlr-poc"}'

# 4. Audit report
curl "https://api.kenosian.com/audit?ctx_id=dlr-poc&window=3600" \
  -H "X-API-Key: <your-api-key>"